Plaintiffs Original Petition and Requests for Disclosure December 29, 2020 (2024)

Case

EIV GW RIDGE LLC vs. WILLIAMS, CHRISTOPHER GENTRY

Jul 09, 2024 |LAUREN REEDER |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |202443073

Case

PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF BALMORAL, INC vs. POP DEVELOPMENT LLC

Jul 12, 2024 |CHRISTINE WEEMS |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |202443768

Case

THREE RIVERS TRUCKING INC vs. XRI HOLDINGS LLC

Jul 11, 2024 |LAUREN REEDER |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |202443429

Case

WOODLAND TRAILS NORTH COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCI vs. ALEMAN, EMILIANO

Jul 08, 2024 |BEAU MILLER |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |202442973

Case

TOWNE LAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INC vs. FEINER, HEATHER

Case

BEECHNUT PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. ASFAN, EYRUSALEM Z

Jul 11, 2024 |BRITTANYE MORRIS |Expedited Foreclosure Proceeding |Expedited Foreclosure Proceeding |202443439

Case

LANGHAM CREEK COLONY SECTIONS 1 AND 2 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC vs. VILLAGOMEZ, JOSE A

Jul 09, 2024 |ELAINE H PALMER |Expedited Foreclosure Proceeding |Expedited Foreclosure Proceeding |202443033

Case

NIRP MANAGEMENT LLC (D/B/A PAD SPECIALISTS MANAGEMENT) vs. STINSON, JED

Jul 09, 2024 |KRISTEN BRAUCHLE HAWKINS |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION |202443159

Case

PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF BALMORAL, INC vs. CHEN, YIGUAN

Jul 12, 2024 |BEAU MILLER |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |202443762

Ruling

GERSHMAN PROPERTIES, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS CH GLENDORA, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Jul 09, 2024 |24PSCV00472

Case Number: 24PSCV00472 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67. BACKGROUND This is an unlawful detainer action. In February 2023, Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLC (Gershman) entered into a written lease agreement with Defendant CH Glendora, LLC (CH Glendora) in which Gershman agreed to lease commercial property in Glendora to CH Glendora. Subsequently, Gershman alleges CH Glendora breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent. On January 24, 2024, Gershman served a three day notice to pay rent or quit on CH Glendora. CH Glendora subsequently failed to pay rent or vacate the Glendora property. On February 7, 2024, Gershman filed a complaint against CH Glendora and Does 1-30, alleging a cause of action for unlawful detainer. On March 1, 2024, Gershmans process server served CH Glendora by posting notice at the Glendora property. On March 19, 2024, the Court entered default against CH Glendora after CH Glendora failed to file a timely answer. On March 25, 2024, the Court granted a default judgment for Gershman on the issue of possession only. On May 17, 2024, Gershman submitted the present application for default judgment. A case management conference is set for July 9, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has filed to timely respond or appear. A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Gershman seeks default judgment against CH Glendora in the total amount of $43,403.68, including $40,476.72 in damages, $1,604.31 in attorney fees, and $1,322.65 in costs. Because the Court finds Gershman has submitted sufficient evidence, the Court GRANTS Gershmans application for default judgment with the following modification. While Gershman requests $1,604.31 in attorney fees, the correct calculation of attorney fees pursuant to Local Rule 3.214 is $1,604.30. Accordingly, the total requested damages will be reduced to $43,403.67. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Gershmans application for default judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67.

Ruling

CERRITOS RETAIL CENTERCAL, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS WOKCANO CERRITOS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Jul 09, 2024 |24NWCV00981

Case Number: 24NWCV00981 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Cerritos Retail Centercal, LLC vs. Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, Case No. 24NWCV00981 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendant moves ex parte to advance the hearing on the motion to set aside, which is currently set for August 7, 2024. Default judgment was entered on June 14, 2024. Defendant was served a five-day notice to vacate on July 2, 2024. Defendant filed the instant motion on Monday, July 8, 2024. Defendant argues that it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware that it had to answer within five days. On May 29, 2024, the Court issued the following order: [T]he Court conferred with Plaintiffs Counsel, Nahal Zarnighian. There was no appearance by Defendant. The Court stated that it had reviewed Defendants motion to set aside default and was inclined to grant the motion under CCP § 473, subd. (b). Defendant appears to argue that it relied upon a tentative ruling posted by the Court which granted Defendant an opportunity to file a Supplemental Reply by May 14, 2024. Defendant denies having received notice of the Courts final order requiring Defendant to Answer within 5 days. Given the Courts inclination with respect to Defendants motion to set aside default, and in an effort to expedite these proceedings, Plaintiffs Counsel had no opposition to the Court advancing Defendants motion to be heard today. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendants motion to set aside default is ADVANCED to todays date and GRANTED. The demurrer filed on May 20, 2024 is STRICKEN because it was filed when Defendant was still in default. The hearing on Defendants demurrer is ADVANCED to todays date and taken OFF-CALENDAR. Defendant is ORDERED to file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading within 5 days. Clerk to give notice. The Court orders the default entered on 05/16/2024 as to Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, a California limited liability company vacated. Certificate of Mailing is attached. (5/29/24 Minute Order.) In the instant ex parte application, Defendant claims it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware it had to answer within 5 days. However, the minute order reflects that the Clerk provided notice of the Courts ruling to the parties. Moreover, the argument Defendant makes here is the same one it made in its previous motion to set aside default. The Court granted the previous ex parte application. With respect to the instant motion, the Court determines that Defendants claim of ignorance is not supported by the record and is made solely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, the ex parte application is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

Ruling

NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL

Jul 12, 2024 |BC722308

Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSIONThe authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circ*mscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

Ruling

SANCHEZ vs LUTHER

Jul 11, 2024 |PSC2004313

PSC2004313 SANCHEZ vs LUTHER Motion to be Relieved as CounselTentative Ruling: Grant. The Court will sign the proposed order lodged with the Court on June 17,2024. Counsel are reminded that they are not relieved until proof of service of the Court’s signed orderupon Defendant is filed with the Court.

Ruling

ARKAS, LLC VS ELIZABETH RICHTER

Jul 11, 2024 |23LBCV01545

Case Number: 23LBCV01545 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Arkas, LLC filed this action against Defendants, Elizabeth Richter and all unknown occupants, tenants, and subtenants for unlawful detainer on 8/15/23. Defendant filed a response to the complaint on 9/01/23. 2. Trial The Court called this matter for a non-jury trial on 12/06/08 and concluded trial on 12/08/23. Plaintiff appeared through an attorney, Defendant appeared and represented herself. The Court found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. On 12/20/23, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The judgment is for possession only, and does not include an award of monetary damages. 3. Post-Trial Proceedings Defendant has filed numerous post-trial motions and applications. On 12/20/23, she filed an ex parte application for order staying execution of judgment, which was denied. On 1/12/24, at Plaintiffs request, the Court issued a writ of possession. On 2/09/24, Defendant filed a 170.6 challenge to judicial officer, which was denied. On 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside and vacate judgment. It appears this is the motion on calendar today, though Defendant failed to indicate the date for hearing on her moving papers; the motion will be discussed further below. On 5/17/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application to vacate judgment, which was denied. On 5/28/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application for arrest of Sam Ostayon and parties involved in fraud upon the court, which was denied; she also filed an ex parte application to set aside the judgment and quash any writ of possession, which was also denied. 4. Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment CCP §663a a. Grounds for Motion As noted above, on 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside/vacate judgment CCP §663a. There is no notice of motion, and no hearing date. There is, however, a reservation ID number, and it appears Defendant reserved the motion for hearing on 7/11/24. The caption of the motion indicates it is brought per U.S.C.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir., Appx R 8001(d)-1. This is a California state court, and state courts are not governed by federal law. Defendants motion indicates she seeks relief because Sami Mikhael Ostayan falsely stated, under oath, that Arkas is a non-profit company, when it is in reality a for-profit company. Additionally, she contends properties subject to foreclosure are reported to the attorney general for verification of eligible bidders, but Defendants property has not been registered with the AG. Finally, she contends Ostayan was sworn into court under oath as MR. STEIN. b. Summary of Opposition Defendant contends the motion was not timely filed, and because the time limit for ruling on a motion to vacate judgment has expired, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Defendant contends the motion is moot because the sheriffs department completed the lock-out process in May. Defendant contends Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence to support any of her contentions. c. Analysis Per CCP §663a(b), the time for the Court to rule on the motion has expired. The Code makes clear that the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall expire 75 days&after service upon the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of judgment. Plaintiff served written notice of entry of judgment on 12/21/23. The time limit is jurisdictional. See Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393-94. The motion to vacate judgment is therefore denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Ruling

Parkash Pabla et al. vs Gursharn Pabla et al.

Jul 11, 2024 |20CV-03476

20CV-03476 Parkash Pabla, et al. v. Gursharn Pabla, et al.Motion by Defendant Dual Arch International. Inc. for Prevailing Party Attorneys Fees of$136,421.03 pursuant to CCP § 1717 on a breach of contract claim brought by PlaintiffsParkash Oabla and Jaswinder Kaur against Dual Arch International, Inc.On June 6, 2024, this matter was Continued on the Court’s own motion to Thursday, July11, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8. However, remittitur has not yet issued as of July 8,2024, the last action occurring being the Denial of a Request for Publication issued May16, 2024. Accordingly, this motion is further continued to July 25, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. inCourtroom 8.Defendant Dual Arch International, Inc. bases its CCP § 1717 claim for attorneys’ fees on(1) Plaintiff’s Oppositiion to Defendant Dual Arch International, Inc.’s Motion to Tax filedApril 12, 2023; and (2) Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ Opening Brief in Appeal No. F086273 filedDecember 19, 2023. (See Request for Judicial Notice filed May 3, 2024, [containing non-file endorsed copies of above documents].) While this Motion was pending, the Court ofAppeal, Fifth Appellat District issued, May 14, 2024, an Opinion inc case F086273affirming the cost order of the trial court. Remittitur has not yet issued in that matter,but, absent an appeal to the California Supreme Court, would be expected to issue June13, 2024. Since the May 14, 2024 Appellate Opinion will not be final until a date on orafter June 13, 2024, this motion was previously continued to July 11, 2024 and is nowfurther continued to July 25, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8.While the above motion was pending, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Jaswinder Kaurand Parkash Pabla filed Cross-Defendants’ Request for Entry of Judgment after Appealon Cross Complainant ECP, LP’s Special Motion to Strike seeking entry of judgmentagainst Cross-Complainant ECP, LP in the amount of $6,500 attorneys’ fees and$1,040.40 costs, total judgment $7,540.40. All parties are ordered to appear on Thursday,July 11, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8 and show cause why this Court should notenter judgment in favor of Cross-Defendants Jaswinder Kaur and Parkash Pabla andagainst Cross Complainant ECP, LP in the amount of of $6,500 attorneys’ fees and$1,040.40 costs, total judgment $7,540.40. The Order to Show Cause if also continuedfrom July 11, 2024, to July 25, 2024, at 8:14 A.M. in Courtroom 8.

Ruling

IVAN D. RODRIGUEZ VS EVARISTO RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, ET AL.

Jul 12, 2024 |24STCV02455

Case Number: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 IVAN D. RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. EVARISTO RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ; LENEICE WHITE; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: 7/12/24 Trial Date: None set [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants Demurrer and Motion to Strike. Facts Plaintiff Ivan Rodriguez rented the property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 to Defendants. On or around December 28, 2023, plaintiff listed the property for sale to which defendants disagreed. On or around January 17, 2024, real estate agent Jesse Uribe conducted a title search and discovered a grant deed recorded on December 29, 2023. The deed, identified as instrument number 20230919365 grants defendant a 50% interest in the property as joint tenants with plaintiff who claims he was unaware of the forged deed until informed by Uribe on January 17, 2024. On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for: 1. Quiet Title 2. Cancellation of Instrument 3. Declaratory Relief 4. Negligence 5. Payment on Bond. Defendant Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez (Defendant) demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action on three grounds: (1) that the pleadings are vague and the complaint is based on information and belief as to matters for which Defendant does not have superior knowledge; (2) as to the first cause of action for quiet title, the complaint must be amended to reflect the date as of which the determination is sought and the pleadings are vague and unintelligible; and (3) as to the second cause of action for cancellation of instrument, the complaint fails to allege how Plaintiff knows that Defendant forged the purported grant deed when Plaintiff has possession of the driver license that was presented to the notary public, the pleadings are vague and unintelligible such that Defendant cannot respond to such allegations of ultimate facts made on information and belief that are not within his superior knowledge, and Defendant is in essence investigating the facts that Plaintiff should have discovered prior to bringing the action. The Court analyzes each ground in turn. Meet and Confer The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement for this motion has been satisfied. (See Graham Decl., ¶ 2.) Demurrer Analysis: The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer challenges only legal sufficiency of complaint, not truth or accuracy of its factual allegations or plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. (Assurance Co. of Am. v. Haven (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 78, 82.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP § 430.30(a).) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence." (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) Quiet Title A plaintiff alleges a quiet title action where they allege that [1] the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land and [2] that the defendant claims an interest therein [3] adverse to him. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740; see also Gray v Walker (1910) 157 Cal. 381, 384 [the complaint contains a statement of all the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. It avers that plaintiff is the owner and in possession of certain land, that defendant claims an interest therein adverse to plaintiff, and that such claim is without right.].) However, generally, the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the legal owner. (Lewis v. Superior Ct. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1866; see also Staffor v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 294-95 [It has been held consistently that the owner of an equitable interest cannot maintain an action to quiet title against the owner of the legal title.]) There is a limited exception to this rule, in the case where legal title was acquired through fraud. (See Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 114.) Legal title does not have a strict legal meaning. (Solomon v. Walton (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 381, 386.) The term legal title has been defined as one cognizable or enforceable in a court of law, or one which complete and perfect so far as regards the apparent right of ownership and possession, but which carries no beneficial interest in the property, another person being equitably entitled thereto. . . (Parkmerced Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1094-95.) Defendant argues that the claim for quiet title action fails because Plaintiff failed to plead the date as of which the determination is sought and failed to provide the information which he relied upon to believe that Defendant committed forgery. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title as the complaint alleges that Defendant obtained title by fraud. Since Plaintiff seeks to establish title against the adverse claims of Defendant, he argues that the claim for quiet title is the appropriate remedy. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of real property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 (Compl. ¶ 6), that a forged deed purports to grant Defendant a 50% gift interest in the subject property (Compl. ¶ 10), and that Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against all adverse claims as of December 29, 2023 as they are without any right whatsoever. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title. Cancellation of Instrument To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud; and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of one's position. (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 1180, 1193-94.) Defendant argues that the complaint fails to provide the information which led Plaintiff to believe that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez committed forgery. Defendant also asserts that the complaint fails to allege tender, to the extent that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez is the equitable owner, and Plaintiff holds title as constructive trustee with no authority to list the property for sale out from under Defendant. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for cancellation of instrument as he is attacking the forged deed and is seeking an order to cancel the forged deed. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Grant Deed recorded on December 29, 2023 is a forged deed that is void or voidable and that said grant deed will cause Plaintiff serious injury as he is being deprived of his 100% ownership in the subject property. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-21.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for cancellation of instrument. Declaratory Relief Plaintiff argues that he is seeking a judicial determination that he is the 100% owner of the subject property and that Defendant has no interest in the subject property. Plaintiff states he is seeking a judicial declaration that the forged deed is invalid. Defendant provides no arguments as to why the claim for declaratory relief fails as a matter of law. The complaint requests declaratory relief in the form of a judicial declaration that Plaintiff is 100% owner of the subject property and Defendant holds no interest in the Subject Property. The Court finds this is sufficient. Accordingly, the demurrer OVERRULED. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Ruling

LEE GREENBERG VS. JERRY BENJAMIN ET AL

Jul 11, 2024 |CGC24612607

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 11, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT MICHELLE HORNEFF-COHEN , AN INDIVIDUAL, HORNEFF WADDLE CORPORATION, DBA PROPERTY DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action against the moving defendants in light of the repeated allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff became an owner of the Property in 2020 and Defendants started managing the property in 2003 pursuant to an agreement with the Benjamins. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

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